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RESUMEN (MÁXIMO: 150 PALABRAS) 
 
O objectivo deste artigo é verificar se os presidentes das Câmaras Municipais portuguesas conseguem aumentar a 
probabilidade de reeleição ao gerarem ciclos político-económicos. Mais concretamente, testa-se a hipótese de que 
aumentos pré-eleitorais nas despesas municipais e alterações na sua composição, favorecendo as componentes 
mais visíveis ou preferidas pela população, resultam em maiores percentagens de votos. A investigação é 
conduzida numa base de dados em painel para todos os municípios de Portugal continental, de 1979 a 2001. 
 
Os resultados empíricos mostram que maiores investimentos em anos de eleições autárquicas estão associados a 
maiores percentagens de votos para os presidentes de câmara. Este efeito é mais forte para as últimas eleições, 
nas quais Portugal já era uma democracia estabelecida, do que quando ainda era uma nova democracia. Finalmente, 
os resultados apoiam a hipótese de que o eleitoralismo também se manifesta ao nível da composição das despesas 
de investimento. 
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Abstract: 
This article tests the hypothesis that the opportunistic manipulation of financial 
accounts by mayors increases their chances of re-election. Working with a large 
and detailed dataset comprising all Portuguese mainland municipalities, which 
covers the municipal elections that took place from 1979 to 2001, we clearly show 
that increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of 
spending favouring highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages 
for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. Our results also indicate that the political 
payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-
established in the country. 
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1. Introduction 
 The objective of the present article is to determine whether opportunistic 
mayors can increase their chances of re-election by generating political business 
cycles around elections. We test the hypothesis that pre-electoral increases in 
municipal expenditures and changes in their composition, favouring items most 
visible to or preferred by the electorate, are associated with higher vote 
percentages for the incumbent mayor. Research is conducted over a dataset 
comprising all the Portuguese mainland municipalities, from 1979 to 2001. 
In previous work, Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found strong evidence of political 
budgetary cycles in Portuguese municipalities. Their analysis reveals that deficits, 
and expenditures, particularly investment, increase significantly in election years 
and, in some cases, in the year before. They also showed that electoral cycles were 
stronger for investment items highly visible to the electorate, for example, 
construction spending on public infra-structure. Given these results, it would also 
be interesting to investigate: (1) if voters reward politicians’ opportunistic spending 
policies, or punish them, as suggested by Peltzman (1992); (2) if the items 
targeted by mayors’ electoral policies are those that generate more votes. 
Additionally, because democracy was reestablished in Portugal in 1974, during our 
sample period the country has evolved from a “new” to an “established” 
democracy. This makes Portugal an appropriate laboratory for analyzing if the 
determinants of electoral results change as a democracy matures. In the article, we 
also test if the popularity of the national government conditions local electoral 
results, and whether time in office decreases incumbents’ popularity. 
The international literature on vote and popularity functions is already quite 
extensive (Paldam, 2004). However, most of the research concentrates on national 
governments and the Portuguese case is clearly under researched. At the local 
level, there is only Costa (1998), who analysed the 1989 and 1993 municipal 
elections. At the national level, Veiga and Veiga (2004a), and Veiga and Veiga 
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(2004b) estimate, respectively, popularity functions for the four main Portuguese 
political entities and vote intentions functions for the main political parties in the 
country.  
Use of data for Portuguese municipalities is also motivated by the following 
reasons. First, we have very detailed data on local governments’ financial accounts. 
Second, the mayor is a principal decision-maker in the allocation of resources and 
the distribution of investment in the municipality. Third, the institutional structure 
of local governments and the policy instruments available are the same for all 
localities, making this panel preferable to one composed of several countries. 
Finally, election dates are fixed and defined exogenously from the perspective of 
the local authorities, and all municipalities have elections on the same day. 
 This article is organized as follows. The next section presents some 
background information on Portuguese municipalities. Section 3 describes the data 
sources and section 4 the empirical model. Results are discussed in section 5. 
Finally, section 6 reports the conclusions. 
 
2. Portuguese municipalities: brief characterization 
This section presents some background information on Portuguese 
municipalities. Democracy was re-established in Portugal by the bloodless military 
coup of April 25, 1974, which put an end to 48 years of dictatorship. Portuguese 
municipalities were formally established in the Constitution of 1976 and the first 
municipal elections took place in December of the same year. Portuguese local 
governments are responsible for improving their populations’ well-being, promoting 
social and economic development, territory organization, and for supplying local 
public goods (water and sewage, energy, transportation, housing, healthcare, 
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education, culture, sports, defence of the environment, and protection of the 
civilian population).1  
The representative branches of municipalities’ government are the Town 
Council and the Municipal Assembly2. The members of the Town Council are elected 
directly by voters registered in the municipality, who vote for party or independent 
lists. Votes are then transformed into mandates using the Hondt method, and the 
mayor is the first candidate from the list that receives the most votes. Part of the 
Municipal Assembly is elected directly by voters while the remaining members are 
the presidents of the councils of the freguesias that belong to the municipality.3 The 
Municipal Assembly approves the general framework for local policies, while the 
Town Council, which holds the executive power, is responsible for its elaboration 
and implementation. The mayor is the president of the Town Council and has a 
prominent role in the executive.  
Budgeting rules and institutions are the same for all Portuguese mainland 
municipalities, although the law regulating local public finances changed during the 
period considered.4 Municipalities are financially autonomous. They have their own 
employees and assets, and they define the local budget and the plan of activities 
without a requirement of authorization from a higher-ranked authority. As part of 
the general government sector, local authorities are, however, subject to several 
control mechanisms by central government agencies. These limit their access to 
revenues as well as their expenditure choices. 
It is worth noting that election dates are defined exogenously from the 
perspective of the local authorities and that during our sample period there was no 
legal restriction to the number of terms a mayor could stand for re-election. Since 
                                                 
1 Law 159/99 defines the areas of intervention of Portuguese local governments. 
2 Law 169/99 establishes the competencies and the legal framework of municipalities’ branches.  
3 Freguesias are subdivisions of municipalities. They are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal.  
4 Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84, Law 1/87 and, currently, Law 42/98. 
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the re-establishment of Democracy in 1974, there were local elections in December 
of 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001, and in October 2005. 
 
3. Data sources 
The dataset is composed of data on a set of political, financial and economic 
variables for the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities. Due to the restrictions 
imposed by data availability, the election years covered in this study are 1979, 
1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001.5 Since this article tries to determine 
whether or not political opportunism of mayors pays off, only the cases in which 
they run for re-election are considered. 
Political data, namely election dates and municipal electoral results, were 
obtained from the National Electoral Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) 
and from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process 
(Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral) of the Internal Affairs 
Ministry. The government popularity index is based on the monthly surveys 
published in the newspaper Expresso, from 1986 to 2001. 
Data on municipal local accounts and population were obtained from the 
local authority’s (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais) annual publication called 
Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). This report exists from 1979 to 1983 and 
from 1986 to 2002. For the two missing years data was obtained directly from the 
municipalities’ official accounts and are incomplete: we have 182 observations for 
1984 and 189 for 1985. Consumer price indexes were taken from the OECD’s Main 
Economic Indicators. Data on the total number of employees in firms within each 
municipality and on their average wages, from 1985 to 2000, was obtained from 
the “Quadros de Pessoal” database, of the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social 
                                                 
5 Although there was also an election in October 2005, data on the municipal financial accounts is only 
available until 2003. The election of 1979 is not covered in several estimations (whenever lags, term 
means or deviations from term means are included). 
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Solidarity (MTSS).6 Finally, data on the Municipal Purchasing Power Index, for the 
years 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002 and 2004 was obtained from the National 
Statistics Office (INE). 
 
4. Specification of the empirical model 
 The empirical models to be estimated for a panel of 2757 municipalities, over 
a maximum of seven elections, use the percentage of votes obtained by the 
incumbent in the current elections, Votes, as the dependent variable. In the set of 
explanatory variables, we start by including the percentage of votes obtained by 
the incumbent in the previous balloting, Votes (Previous Election).8 This variable 
accounts for the support the mayor enjoyed at the start of the term and for factors 
not considered in the other explanatory variables, such as the mayor’s personal 
characteristics, ideology and party affiliation of voters, socio-economic 
characteristics of each municipality, etc.  
The erosion of the mayor’s popularity as he/she stays longer in power is 
accounted for by including a variable, Years President, that counts the number of 
years during which the incumbent has remained in power (a negative estimated 
coefficient is expected for this variable). Mayors’ popularity tends to decrease with 
time in office because the policy actions, even if supported by most of the 
electorate, will tend to alienate some voters, who will then support the opposition 
(Mueller, 1970, and Frey and Schneider, 1978). Voter support may also decay when 
mayors fail to deliver what they promised during the electoral campaigns (Mueller, 
1970). 
                                                 
6 The “Quadros de Pessoal” is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers virtually all privately 
owned firms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included). 
Although the most recent year for which data is available is 2003, there is no data on wages for 2001. 
7 For the three municipalities created in 1997 (Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela) there is only election data for 
2001 (the last election in our sample), which means that there is no data for the votes obtained in the 
previous elections. Thus, in the estimations, we have a maximum of 275 municipalities. 
8 It is worth mentioning that Votes (Previous Election) is not always equal to the first lag of Votes. That 
only happens in municipalities in which the mayor was always reelected. In fact, the correlation between 
Votes (Previous Election) and lagged Votes is around 75%. 
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It is also possible that the votes for an incumbent mayor whose political 
party is in charge of the national government are affected by the popularity of the 
latter. That is, the electorate may also wish to reward, or punish, the national 
government in second order elections. Carsey and Wright (1998, p. 995) formulate 
this possibility in the following manner for the United States: 
“For many citizens, political judgements are general indictments or rewards 
of the party in power, usually defined as the presidential party. Thus, we 
expect presidential approval to influence all types of subpresidential voting 
behaviour.”  
We account for this possibility with an interaction variable that consists in 
multiplying the dummy variable Government’s Party (that takes the value of one 
when the mayor’s party is that of the Prime Minister, and equals zero otherwise) by 
the value of the Government Popularity Index in the month of the elections.9 Since 
a more popular government may help the mayors of the same party getting higher 
percentages of votes, a positive coefficient is expected for Government’s 
Party*Government Popularity. One problem with this variable is that it leads to 
many missing values, as the popularity data is only available from 1986 onwards. 
In order to be able to work with data since 1979, another interaction variable was 
created, which consists in multiplying the dummy variable Government’s Party by 
the national Inflation Rate. Since voters tend to punish the national government for 
bad economic outcomes,10 higher inflation should lead to lower percentages of 
votes for the incumbent mayors of the government’s party (a negative coefficient is 
expected for this interaction variable). 
 The first group of tests of the hypothesis that opportunism pays off use data 
on more aggregated accounts, such as budget balances, taxes and total 
                                                 
9 See Veiga and Veiga (2004a) for the definition of the index and for graphs that illustrate its evolution. 
10 On the responsibility hypothesis and for a survey of the vote/popularity functions literature, see 
Paldam (2004). For evidence on the Portuguese case, at the national level, see Veiga and Veiga (2004a 
and 2004b). 
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expenditures. We then test the hypothesis using more detailed data. First, we split 
expenditures into current and capital. Second, we estimate models for total 
investment expenditures (the main component of capital expenditures). Finally, its 
components and sub-components are also analysed. This very detailed analysis, 
that considers all types of investment expenditures, allows for the identification of 
those for which pre-electoral manipulation would increase the percentage of votes 
for the incumbent. That is, we are able to identify the types of expenditures that 
opportunistic mayors should target and to check whether or not they correspond to 
those for which Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found evidence of political business cycles. 
Ultimately, votes should be driven by the incumbent’s performance and not 
necessarily by the magnitude or the composition of expenditures. Since there is no 
data on the quality of the services provided by the Portuguese municipalities, we 
use the few measures of municipal economic performance that are available. Thus, 
the final step of the empirical analysis is to control for the evolution of 
employment,11 wages and purchasing power in each municipality. Descriptive 
statistics for all the variables mentioned above are presented in Table 1.12 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Two empirical models will be estimated in order to check if opportunism 
pays off. In the first, the levels of the variables that may be the object of 
opportunism in the election year and in the two previous years are included along 
with the political variables referred to above. The empirical model can be specified 
as follows: 
 itititiitititelpreviit GPYPVotesVotes ενγφα +++++++= −− 3' 2,2' 1,1'.., βXβXβX
 2001,1997,1993,1989,1985,1982,1979  275,...,1 == ti  (1) 
                                                 
11 See Coelho, Veiga and Veiga (forthcoming) for a study of political business cycles in municipal 
employment. 
12 The descriptive statistics for the components and sub-components of investment expenditures were 
not included in order to economize space, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
 8
where Votesit is the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent’s party in the 
election of year t, Votesi,prev.el. is the percentage of votes obtained in the previous 
election, YPit stands for Years President and GPit stands for Government’s 
Party*Inflation Rate or for Government’s Party*Government Popularity, X is a 
vector of variables subject to opportunistic manipulation (their levels in the election 
year, t; the year before elections, t-1; and two years before elections, t-2, are 
included),13 νi is the individual effect of municipality i, εit is the error term, α, φ and γ 
are parameters and β1, β2 and β3 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. 
Evidence that opportunism pays off would be consistent with a positive and 
statistically significant β1, eventually, a positive and statistically significant β2, and a 
negative or statistically insignificant β3. 
The second model uses the term mean and the percentage deviation of the 
level in the election year relative to the term mean of the variables included in 
vector X. The empirical model can be specified as follows: 
 ititiitititelpreviit GPYPVotesVotes ενγφα ++++++= 2' ,1'.., βXdevβXtm
 2001,1997,1993,1989,1985,1982,1979  275,...,1 == ti  (2) 
where Xtm is a vector of term means of the variables included in X, Xdev is a 
vector of the percentage deviations of their election year values from the term 
means, and all the remaining variables and parameters are defined as in equation 
(1). Evidence that opportunism pays off would be consistent with a positive and 
statistically significant β2. A positive and statistically significant β1 means that 
greater average values of the X variables over a term are associated with greater 
percentages of votes. 
                                                 
13 Since the first terms were only three-years long, when working with the full sample it is not possible 
to include the level of X three years before elections, because in those cases it would be an election 
year. That value will be included when working just with the most recent elections. 
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5. Empirical results 
 The estimation results of the panel data models described in the previous 
section, controlling for municipality fixed effects,14 are shown in Table 2.15 T-
statistics are presented between parentheses and the degree of statistical 
significance is signalled with asterisks. The number of observations, municipalities 
and elections, and the adjusted R squared are reported at the foot of the table. 
 In column 1 of Table 2, we report the results of the estimation of the model 
of equation (1) for three variables which may be subject to opportunistic 
manipulation by mayors: the municipal Budget Balance, Taxes, and Total 
Expenditures.16 Although Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found evidence of political 
business cycles in these three variables, none of them seems to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the votes obtained.17 As expected, Votes (Previous 
Election) has a positive sign and is statistically significant, indicating that there is 
some persistence in vote shares. There is also evidence of popularity erosion over 
time, as Years President is statistically significant with a negative sign. The same 
result is obtained for Government’s Party*Inflation Rate, indicating that when 
inflation is high, mayors that belong to the prime minister’s party tend to lose 
votes. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 The results of the estimation of the model of equation (2) are reported in 
column 2. Again, there is no evidence that the manipulation of the Budget Balance 
                                                 
14 Municipal dummy variables are globally statistically significant, and Hausman tests indicate that a 
fixed effects specification is always preferable to a random effects one. 
15 As explained above, Votes (Previous Election) is not the first lag of Votes (their correlation is around 
75%). Thus, the implementation of the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator for linear 
dynamic panel data models would not be appropriate. Nevertheless, we estimated it just as a robustness 
check, and the results (available upon request) were similar to those presented in this paper.  
16 For each municipality, all fiscal variables were divided by the consumer price index for the base year 
(1995) and, then, by its population. Thus, they are expressed in euros (of 1995) per capita. The budget 
balance, based on public accounting, is calculated according to the methodology of the General Direction 
of the Budget (Direcção Geral do Orçamento) of the Ministry of Finance, which excludes the transactions 
in financial assets and liabilities from the totals of revenues and expenditures. 
17 As indicated in equation (1), we started with the estimation of a model which also included the values 
of the three fiscal variables one and two years before the elections. Then, these lagged values were 
sequentially excluded from the model when they turned out not statistically significant. 
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or of Taxes affects votes. Concerning Total Expenditures, their Term Mean is 
positive and statistically significant, meaning that mayors who have higher average 
expenditures over the term tend to get more votes. But, spending relatively more 
in the election year does not seem to result in higher vote shares, as the % 
Deviation of the Election Year from the Term Mean is not statistically significant. 
 In the estimations of columns 3 and 4, the dummy variable Government’s 
Party was interacted with Government Popularity instead of with the inflation rate. 
As expected, this interaction variable is statistically significant, with a positive sign. 
Now, Total Expenditures in the election year are highly statistically significant 
(column 3), indicating that greater expenditures lead to higher percentages of 
votes.18 The difference of results when comparing to those of column 1 may be 
explained by the fact that in the estimation of column 3 only the last 4 elections are 
considered, while that of column 1 considers all 7 elections that took place during 
the sample period.19  
 In order to study the possibility that opportunism worked better in the most 
recent elections, the sample was split in two: one sub-sample covers the first four 
elections (1979, 1982, 1985 and 1989), while the other covers the last three 
elections (1993, 1997 and 2001). Results of columns 5 and 6 imply that 
opportunism did not work in the period 1979-1989, as the fiscal variables are never 
statistically significant.20 In the period 1990-2001, the opportunistic manipulation of 
Total Expenditures seems to have worked well. Expenditures in the election year 
are positively related to votes (columns 7 and 9), with 90 to 100 euros per capita of 
additional expenditures resulting in an increase of one percentage point in the vote 
share. In columns 8 and 10, both the term mean expenditures and the percentage 
                                                 
18 When including the levels of expenditures for the election year and for previous years only the one for 
the election year is statistically significant. When including one at a time, the level for the election year 
has the highest t-ratio. This result confirms the evidence for voter myopia found in the vote/popularity 
functions literature (see Paldam, 2004). 
19 Results for the term average of Total Expenditures may be stronger in column 4 than in column 2 for 
the same reason. 
20 Since the data on the government’s popularity only starts in 1986, it is not possible to include it in the 
estimations for the period 1979-1989. 
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deviation of election year expenditures from the term mean are positive and 
statistically significant. This implies that for a mayor it is both worthwhile to spend 
more on average over the term, and to increase expenditures in the election year 
relative to the previous years of the same electoral cycle.21 
 The fact that opportunism paid off better in the most recent Portuguese 
municipal elections contradicts the results of Brender and Drazen (2005) that 
indicate that political business cycles tend to work in new democracies but not in 
established ones. That is, our results imply that they worked better as the 
Portuguese democracy became more established (1990-2001) than in the first 
elections after the restoration of democracy in 1974. A possible explanation for this 
result is that, as democracy matured, not only voters learned about the democratic 
system; politicians may also have acquired more knowledge on how to implement 
electoral politics. It is worth mentioning that according to Alt and Lassen (2006), 
conditioning on the degree of fiscal policy transparency, electoral cycles also exist 
in advanced industrialized economies. Therefore, in line with Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988) and Rogoff (1990) models of rational opportunistic budget cycles, our result 
suggest that, even in the latter years of democracy, there is asymmetry of 
information between voters and politicians, that the latter explore by manipulating 
budgetary items in order to increase their chances of reelection. 
 The next step of the analysis was to determine which type of expenditures 
produced greater effects on votes. For that purpose, Current and Capital 
Expenditures were considered in the models of Table 3. It is worth mentioning that, 
when considering more than on type of expenditures, opportunism can take two 
forms: increased expenditures in the election year; and, strategic changes in the 
                                                 
21 Concerning political variables, results are similar across the sub-samples, except for Government’s 
Party*Inflation Rate, which has a positive sign in 1993-2001, and is marginally statistically significant. 
That change in the sign may be due to the fact that inflation was no longer a major economic problem 
by the time of the elections of 1997 and 2001, as it reached low levels comparable to those of the other 
EU members. 
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composition of expenditures favouring the type(s) most preferred by the 
electorate.22 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The coefficients associated with Current Expenditures are generally not 
statistically significant, which means that its opportunistic manipulation does not 
tend to increase votes (the exceptions are columns 3 and 10). Results for Capital 
Expenditures are similar to those obtained for Total Expenditures in Table 2. The 
main difference is that expenditures in the Election Year and in the Year Before 
Election are also significant in column 1. Thus, there is evidence that higher Capital 
Expenditures prior to elections help gaining votes and that it also would pay off to 
strategically shift funds from Current to Capital Expenditures.23 
Since Investment Expenditures account on average for almost 90% of 
Capital Expenditures, and are their most visible component to voters, it is likely 
that this is the type of expenditures that has greater impact on votes. In fact, 
results for Investment Expenditures, presented in Table 4, are stronger than those 
for Capital Expenditures shown in Table 3: t-statistics are generally higher, the % 
Deviation of the Election Year from the Term Mean is now also statistically 
significant for the full sample (column 2), and the expenditures in the Election Year 
are marginally significant in the period 1979-1989 (column 5). These stronger 
effects of Investment Expenditures on votes are consistent with the results of Veiga 
and Veiga (2004c), who found evidence of greater political business cycles in that 
type of expenditures than in the other fiscal items analysed.24 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
                                                 
22 See Drazen and Eslava (2005) for a theoretical model on opportunism via expenditure composition. 
23 A similar result was obtained by Drazen and Eslava (2005) for Colombian municipalities. A result 
indicating that it may be worth increasing expenditures of both types is that of column 3. 
24 Using data only for the municipal elections of 1989 and 1993, Costa (1998) found out that investment 
expenditures had a positive effect on votes, while current expenditures, such as disbursements to 
compensation of employees, seemed to have no effects. 
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In the estimations of Table 5, investment expenditures are broken up into 
their seven components. In column 1, only Other Buildings and Miscellaneous 
Constructions are statistically significant. These results, confirmed in column 3 
where only these two components are considered, were somewhat expected, as 
these are the most important and most visible components of Investment 
Expenditures. Although estimation results shown in column 2 only present evidence 
that opportunism pays off for Other Buildings, and eventually for Other 
Investments, those of column 4 show that is also worthwhile to spend more on 
average in Miscellaneous Constructions. Thus, an opportunistic mayor can gain 
votes by strategically shifting funds from the five components of Investment 
Expenditures that are not statistically significant into Other Buildings and/or 
Miscellaneous Constructions.25 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 Since we have very detailed data on the municipal accounts, we are able to 
disaggregate Investment Expenditures even further, in order to analyse the three 
components of Other Buildings and the six components of Miscellaneous 
Constructions. The results of the estimation of the model of equation (1) for these 
nine sub-components of Investment Expenditures are shown in column 1 of Table 
6. These indicate that votes can be gained by increasing expenditures in the 
election year (or in the year before, in some cases) in Social Equipment, Other, 
Overpasses, streets and complementary works, and in Rural roads. In columns 2 
and 3, where only the components of Other Buildings are considered, evidence that 
opportunism pays off is confirmed for Social Equipment and Other. Finally, the 
results of column 4, for a model including only the components of Miscellaneous 
Constructions, confirm that higher expenditures in Overpasses, streets and 
                                                 
25 In order to economize space, only the results obtained when using Government’s Party*Inflation Rate 
(the one for which the number of observations is higher) are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Results when 
using Government’s Party*Government Popularity are very similar (they are available upon request) 
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complementary works (in the year before election) and in Rural roads (in the 
election year) tend to result in higher percentages of votes for the incumbent.26  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
These results are consistent with those of Veiga and Veiga (2004c), who 
found that the sub-components Other, Overpasses, streets and complementary 
works and Rural roads were those for which there was greater evidence of 
opportunism by mayors. They also found evidence of strategic expenditure 
switching among sub-components of Investment Expenditures. That is, close to 
elections, mayors reduce expenditures on some items in order to be able to spend 
more on those most favoured by the electorate. 
 The last step of the empirical analysis was to include variables accounting 
for the economic performance of municipalities. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, 
municipal Employment and average Wages (which can be used as a proxy for 
income)27 were included alongside with Investment Expenditures. Results for the 
latter are very similar to those obtained in Table 4. While Employment does not 
seem to affect votes, higher Wages in the election year (column 1) and higher 
mean wages over the term (column 2) lead to greater percentages of votes for the 
incumbent.28 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Finally, the INE’s municipal Purchasing Power Index (PPI) was included in 
the estimations of columns 3 and 4. This Index is constructed in a way that takes 
into account over 20 variables that reflect the purchasing power of each 
municipality. It measures a municipality’s purchasing power relative to the country 
average, which equals 100. Thus, increasing values of the PPI over time for a 
                                                 
26 Since some investment expenditures take time to produce results visible to the population, in some 
cases it is the investment made in the year before the election that has greater effects on votes. 
27 Since data on Wages are not available for 2001, wages in 2000 were used for the 2001 elections. 
28 Since data for unemployment and wages starts in 1985 and that on the purchasing power index starts 
only in 1993, the use of the variable Government’s Party*Government Popularity does no longer imply 
the loss of a great number of observations. Thus, in Table 7 we report the results obtained when using 
this variable. Similar results are obtained when using Government’s Party*Inflation Rate. 
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municipality mean that its purchasing power is increasing relative to the country 
average. Although the value of the Index in the election year is not statistically 
significant, its % Variation over the Term is positive and marginally statistically 
significant in column 4. Thus, there is weak evidence that the growth over a four-
year term of a municipality’s purchasing power relative to the country average 
leads to a higher percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent mayor.29 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Using a very detailed and unexplored dataset covering 275 Portuguese 
municipalities, during the seven local elections that occurred from 1979 to 2001, we 
present clear evidence that the opportunism of mayors (documented in Veiga and 
Veiga, 2004c) pays off. Results show that higher investment expenditures in 
election years lead to higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors in Portuguese 
municipalities. This is especially true for investment expenditures, for which there is 
clear evidence that increases in the election year, relative to the term average, also 
lead to higher percentages of votes for the incumbent. These results are robust to 
the inclusion of economic performance indicators, such as employment, wages and 
a purchasing power index. They are in line with the evidence presented by 
Akhmedov and Zhuravkaya (2004) for Russian regions. 
Concerning the political variables, our results are consistent with popularity 
erosion over time spent in office, with the hypothesis that the popularity of the 
national government affects the votes obtained by incumbent mayors of the same 
party, and with the view that the party holding the national government may also 
be subject to evaluation by voters in second order (municipal, in the present case) 
elections. 
                                                 
29 Since there is data for the PPI only in the years of 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002 and 2004, it is not 
possible to compute term means or % deviations of the levels in election years relative to term means. 
Furthermore, the PPI in 2000 was used for the 2001 elections. 
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 When checking if opportunism by mayors has always led to more votes for 
the incumbent, we found out that it had little or no effects in the elections of 1979 
to 1989. But, results for the last three elections in our sample (1993, 1997, and 
2001) were stronger than for the entire sample, showing that it was in this period 
that opportunism paid off better. The fact that opportunistic spending was more 
vote-productive after Portugal became an established democracy than it had been 
when democracy was newly established contradicts Brender and Drazen (2005), 
who concluded that political budget cycles happen in new but not in established 
democracies. This may be a result of a lack of transparency regarding local fiscal 
policies combined with the acquisition of knowledge by politicians, as democracy 
matured. 
Electoral manipulation can also be accomplished by altering the composition 
of expenditures. As in Drazen and Eslava (2005), results indicate that capital 
expenditures increase votes while current expenditures have little or no effects. 
Thus, opportunistic mayors can gain votes by strategically shifting funds from 
current to capital expenditures (especially to investment) shortly before elections. 
Using detailed data on the municipal fiscal accounts, we show that the types of 
investment expenditures that they should target are: Social Equipment; Other; 
Overpasses, streets and complementary works; and, Rural roads. If increasing total 
expenditures or shifting funds from current expenditures is not possible, mayors 
can gain votes by spending more on these items at the expense of other types of 
investment expenditures less favoured by the electorate. It is also worth noting 
that, with the exception of Social Equipment, these components of investment 
expenditures are the ones for which Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found greater 
evidence of political business cycles. Thus, it seems that Portuguese mayors have 
been manipulating expenditures in a way that increases their chances of re-
election. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observ. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Votes 1348 49.70 11.98 8.65 92.18 
Votes (Previous Election) 1434 50.40 9.78 26.98 91.74 
Years President 1432 7.13 4.50 3.00 25.00 
Government’s Party 1430 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Government Popularity Index 883 43.00 6.82 33.50 52.50 
Inflation Rate 1434 12.41 8.08 2.33 23.66 
Budget Balance (Election year) 1366 -22.63 55.98 -522.12 442.15 
Term Mean 1278 -16.03 34.97 -415.40 163.48 
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1212 204.81 6192.99 -
33367 48 
208627.10 
Taxes (Election year) 1358 43.41 57.83 0.00 565.54 
Term Mean 1278 41.45 53.20 0.00 505.73 
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1204 8.07 22.66 -100.00 148.81 
Total Expenditures (Election year) 1366 388.39 259.10 12.17 2196.64 
Term Mean 1278 355.96 210.41 74.43 1552.56 
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1212 11.73 16.85 -71.89 121.24 
Current Expenditures (Election year) 1364 176.13 131.94 7.07 1049.77 
Term Mean 1278 167.41 115.10 22.30 905.84 
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1210 11.26 11.80 -76.67 71.69 
Capital expenditures (Election year) 1366 212.52 153.03 5.11 1225.84 
Year before election 1202 198.02 129.28 14.03 1189.34 
Term Mean 1278 188.69 118.11 19.30 1144.61 
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1212 13.49 28.03 -76.21 155.36 
Investment expenditures (Election year) 1335 189.95 139.27 5.04 1191.93 
Year before election 1176 174.45 115.18 10.25 857.20 
Term Mean 1278 166.22 106.59 14.13 944.52 
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1181 14.68 30.34 -88.55 169.34 
Total Employment (% population) – Election year 1096 14.81 9.97 1.04 89.73 
Term Mean 883 14.90 9.68 1.18 85.16 
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 883 8.31 11.49 -41.00 82.67 
Wages (Election year) 1096 452.67 99.46 256.62 1005.31 
Term Mean 883 467.03 92.56 281.11 971.16 
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 883 1.11 4.33 -21.69 16.55 
Purchasing Power Index (Election year) 657 64.44 31.51 18.88 305.19 
% Variation Over the Term 443 8.38 16.77 -46.37 102.77 
Sources: DGAL, OECD, MTSS, STAPE and municipal official accounts. 
Note:  The budget balance, taxes, expenditures and wages are expressed in euros per 
capita (at 1995 prices). 
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Table 2: Budget Balance, Taxes and Total Expenditures 
 Full Sample (All Available Observations) 1979 - 1989 1993-2001 (Last Three Elections) 
Votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
Votes (Previous Election) .460 
(12.2)*** 
.463 
(11.4)*** 
.155 
(2.79)*** 
.154 
(2.75)*** 
.457 
(7.12)*** 
.498 
(5.83)*** 
.215 
(3.04)*** 
.196 
(2.75)*** 
.209 
(3.01)*** 
.191 
(2.71)*** 
Years President -.850 
(-10.8)*** 
-.853 
(-10.6)*** 
-.820 
(-8.60)*** 
-.817 
(-8.53)*** 
-1.800 
(-9.70)*** 
-1.939 
(-7.65)*** 
-.798 
(-
6.90)*** 
-.797 
(-
6.92)*** 
-.787 
(-
6.89)*** 
-.790 
(-
6.93)*** 
Government’s Party * 
Inflation Rate 
-.260 
(-6.62)*** 
-.196 
(-4.17)*** 
  -.292 
(-5.62)*** 
-.225 
(-3.16)*** 
.291 
(1.67)* 
.339 
(1.94)* 
  
Government’s Party * 
Government Popularity 
  .040 
(2.31)** 
.041 
(2.38)** 
    .072 
(3.46)*** 
.072 
(3.47)*** 
Budget Balance: 
Election Year 
-.004 
(-.74) 
 .004 
(.56) 
 .015 
(1.11) 
 -.002 
(-.26) 
 -.002 
(-.22) 
 
Term Mean 
 -.002 
(-.15) 
 .010 
(.82) 
 .031 
(.90) 
 .008 
(.62) 
 .006 
(.48) 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 -.00004 
(-.79) 
 -.000001 
(-.03) 
 -.0002 
(-.69) 
 .00006 
(1.02) 
 .0001 
(1.04) 
Taxes: 
Election Year 
.002 
(.22) 
 .014 
(1.02) 
 .027 
(1.10) 
 -.002 
(-.14) 
 -.001 
(-.08) 
 
Term Mean 
 -.0004 
(-.03) 
 -.0001 
(-.004) 
 .082 
(1.62) 
 -.017 
(-.91) 
 -.015 
(-.85) 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 -.013 
(-.89) 
 .013 
(.67) 
 -.003 
(-.12) 
 .032 
(1.12) 
 .027 
(.95) 
Total Expenditures: 
Election Year 
.002 
(1.11) 
 .012 
(4.62)*** 
 .005 
(.51) 
 .010 
(2.78)*** 
 .011 
(2.98)*** 
 
Term Mean 
 .005 
(1.84)* 
 .017 
(5.03)*** 
 -.019 
(-1.20) 
 .015 
(3.13)*** 
 .016 
(3.29)*** 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 .020 
(1.02) 
 .030 
(1.25) 
 -.008 
(-.18) 
 .068 
(2.35)** 
 .063 
(2.22)** 
# Observations 1270 1159 839 839 620 509 650 650 650 650 
# Municipalities 275 275 275 275 264 262 274 274 274 274 
# Elections 7 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Adjusted R2 .35 .36 .35 .35 38 .36 .39 .40 .41 .41 
           
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained 
by the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 3: Current and Capital Expenditures  
 Full Sample (All Available Observations) 1979-1989 1993-2001 (Last Three Elections) 
           Votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
Votes (Previous Election) .425 
(10.4)*** 
.429 
(10.6)*** 
.157 
(2.83)*** 
.155 
(2.80)*** 
.430 
(6.70)*** 
.434 
(5.08)*** 
.213 
(3.04)*** 
.209 
(2.97)*** 
.209 
(3.02)*** 
.202 
(2.92)*** 
Years President -.826 
(-
10.4)*** 
-.832 
(-10.5)*** 
-.803 
(-8.42)*** 
-.831 
(-8.72)*** 
-1.612 
(-
6.96)*** 
-1.559 
(-5.34)*** 
-.801 
(-6.95)*** 
-.813 
(-7.04)*** 
-.790 
(-6.94)*** 
-.806 
(-7.07)*** 
Government’s Party * 
Inflation Rate 
-.201 
(-
4.36)*** 
-.209 
(-4.55)*** 
  -.305 
(-
5.85)*** 
-.243 
(-3.44)*** 
.296 
(1.71)* 
.315 
(1.81)* 
  
Government’s Party * 
Government Popularity 
  .044 
(2.50)** 
.042 
(2.39)** 
    .072 
(3.50)*** 
.074 
(3.61)*** 
                      Current Expenditures:           
           Election Year -.005 
(-1.31) 
 .012 
(2.16)** 
 -.010 
(-.58) 
 .009 
(1.30) 
 .009 
(1.37) 
 
Term Mean  -.009 
(-1.97)** 
 .008 
(1.17) 
 -.036 
(-1.53) 
 .003 
(.31) 
 .002 
(.21) 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 .003 
(.13) 
 -.028 
(-.69) 
 .011 
(.24) 
 .088 
(1.62) 
 .092 
(1.71)* 
                      Capital Expenditures:           
           Election Year .007 
(1.88)* 
 .007 
(1.79)* 
 .012 
(1.51) 
 .011 
(2.50)** 
 .012 
(2.71)*** 
 
Year Before Election .008 
(1.95)* 
 .009 
(2.04)** 
       
Term Mean  .019 
(4.30)*** 
 .021 
(3.67)*** 
 .003 
(.26) 
 .018 
(2.65)*** 
 .020 
(3.05)*** 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 .010 
(.87) 
 .023 
(1.66)* 
 .007 
(.26) 
 .028 
(1.71)* 
 .023 
(1.47) 
                      # Observations 1155 1165 836 839 626 515 650 650 650 649 
# Municipalities 275 275 275 275 266 264 274 274 274 274 
# Elections 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Adjusted R2 .37 .37 .35 .35 .37 .36 .39 .40 .41 .41 
           
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by 
the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which 
the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 4: Investment Expenditures  
 Full Sample (All Available Observations) 1979-1989 1993-2001 (Last Three Elections) 
           Votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
Votes (Previous Election) .447 
(10.9)*** 
.459 
(11.2)*** 
.166 
(2.98)*** 
.159 
(2.85)*** 
.445 
(6.71)*** 
.486 
(5.27)*** 
.237 
(3.42)*** 
.227 
(3.26)*** 
.233 
(3.41)*** 
.220 
(3.18)*** 
           Years President -.836 
(-
10.7)*** 
-.850 
(-10.9)*** 
-.785 
(-8.18)*** 
-.813 
(-8.52)*** 
-1.664 
(-9.22)*** 
-1.672 
(-
6.54)*** 
-.784 
(-
6.79)*** 
-.789 
(-
6.83)*** 
-.772 
(-
6.77)*** 
-.782 
(-6.85)*** 
           Government’s Party * 
Inflation Rate 
-.172 
(-
3.75)*** 
-.173 
(-3.81)*** 
  -.279 
(-5.23)*** 
-.206 
(-
2.70)*** 
.258 
(1.50) 
.282 
(1.62) 
  
           Government’s Party * 
Government Popularity 
  .043 
(2.43)** 
.042 
(2.39)** 
    .068 
(3.31)*** 
.070 
(3.37)*** 
                      Investment Expenditures           
           Election Year .008 
(2.01)** 
 .011 
(2.69)*** 
 .014 
(1.73)* 
 .012 
(2.95)*** 
 .013 
(3.21)*** 
 
           Year Before Election .007 
(1.54) 
 .012 
(2.27)** 
       
           Term Mean  .017 
(3.88)*** 
 .029 
(5.61)*** 
 .005 
(.34) 
 .018 
(2.80)*** 
 .020 
(3.21)*** 
           % Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 .018 
(1.71)* 
 .023 
(1.83)* 
 .017 
(.63) 
 .033 
(2.34)** 
 .029 
(2.12)** 
                      # Observations 1128 1136 836 839 597 486 650 649 650 650 
# Municipalities 275 275 275 275 261 259 274 274 274 274 
# Elections 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Adjusted R2 .37 .37 .34 .35 .36 .33 .39 .39 .40 .41 
           
Notes: - Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; 
- Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent; 
- Models estimated with a constant; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 5: Components of Investment Expenditures  
Votes 1 2 3 4 
     
Votes (Previous Election) .335 
(6.42)*** 
.363 
(4.62)*** 
.334 
(6.52)*** 
.344 
(6.72)*** 
Years President -.887 
(-
9.72)*** 
-.810 
(-5.59)*** 
-.863 
(-9.61)*** 
-.886 
(-9.80)*** 
Government’s Party * Inflation Rate -.146 
(-2.05)** 
-.055 
(-.48) 
-.182 
(-2.67)*** 
-.179 
(-2.63)*** 
Acquisition of Land: 
Election Year 
.025 
(.74) 
   
Term Mean 
 .120 
(1.17) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .004 
(.72) 
  
Housing: 
Election Year 
.017 
(1.07) 
   
Term Mean 
 -.031 
(-.83) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .002 
(.49) 
  
Other Buildings: 
Year Before Election 
.039 
(2.95)*** 
 .041 
(3.19)*** 
 
Term Mean 
 .083 
(3.00)*** 
 .041 
(2.44)** 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .022 
(1.78)* 
 .010 
(1.91)* 
Miscellaneous Constructions: 
Election Year 
.011 
(2.46)** 
 .013 
(3.21)*** 
 
Term Mean 
 -.005 
(-.53) 
 .019 
(3.00)*** 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .004 
(.23) 
 .005 
(.51) 
Transportation Material: 
Election Year 
.098 
(1.39) 
   
Term Mean 
 .037 
(.21) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .001 
(.12) 
  
Machinery and Equipment: 
Election Year 
.036 
(.75) 
   
Term Mean 
 .134 
(1.35) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .001 
(.05) 
  
Other Investments: 
Election Year 
.021 
(.53) 
   
Term Mean 
 -.051 
(-.46) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .008 
(1.67)* 
  
# Observations 934 520 944 954 
# Municipalities 275 231 275 275 
# Elections 5 5 5 5 
Adjusted R2 .32 .33 .33 .33 
     
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the 
dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent. Models 
estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 6: Components of Other Buildings and of Miscellaneous 
Constructions 
Votes 1 2 3 4 
     
Votes (Previous Election) .298 
(5.67)*** 
.631 
(7.25)*** 
.424 
(5.31)*** 
.332 
(6.35)*** 
     Years President -.889 
(-
9.71)*** 
-.853 
(-9.51)*** 
-.703 
(-4.81)*** 
-.865 
(-9.40)*** 
     Government’s Party * Inflation Rate -.185 
(-
2.64)*** 
-.231 
(-3.79)*** 
-.224 
(-1.77)* 
-.197 
(-2.81)*** 
          Sports, recreational and schooling 
facilities: 
    
Election Year 
.003 
(.22) 
.003 
(.02) 
  
Term Mean 
  .044 
(1.13) 
 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
  .005 
(.95) 
 
     Social equipment:     
Election Year 
.105 
(1.97)** 
.116 
(2.24)** 
  
Term Mean 
  -.020 
(-.18) 
 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
  .007 
(1.74)* 
 
     Other:     
Year Before Election 
.056 
(3.12)*** 
.048 
(2.78)*** 
  
Term Mean 
  .086 
(2.41)** 
 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
  .015 
(1.66)* 
 
          Overpasses, streets and complementary 
works - Year Before Election 
.030 
(2.12)** 
  .041 
(2.94)*** 
     Sewage  
Election Year 
-.023 
(-1.05) 
  -.016 
(-.74) 
     Water treatment and distribution  
Election Year 
-.030 
(-1.84)* 
  -.026 
(-1.63) 
     Rural Roads 
Election Year 
.019 
(2.44)** 
  .021 
(2.60)*** 
     Infrastructures for solid waste treatment  
Election Year 
.047 
(1.11) 
  .041 
(.96) 
     Other Miscellaneous Constructions  
Election Year 
.002 
(.33) 
  .007 
(.87) 
          # Observations 930 977 544 932 
# Municipalities 275 275 252 275 
# Elections 5 6 5 5 
Adjusted R2 .33 .31 .27 .32 
     
Notes: - Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; 
- Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the 
incumbent. Models estimated with a constant; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 7: Investment Expenditures, Employment, Wages and Purchasing 
Power 
Votes 1 2 3 4 
     
Votes (Previous Election) .149 
(2.69)*** 
.148 
(2.66)*** 
.229 
(3.34)*** 
-.069 
(-.78) 
     Years President -.837 
(-
8.80)*** 
-.842 
(-8.84)*** 
-.783 
(-6.80)*** 
-1.166 
(-6.10)*** 
     Government’s Party * Government 
Popularity 
.034 
(1.95)* 
.036 
(2.04)** 
.068 
(3.27)*** 
.068 
(2.95)*** 
          Investment Expenditures:     
Election Year 
.012 
(3.27)*** 
 .013 
(3.00)*** 
 
Term Mean 
 .018 
(3.14)*** 
 .028 
(3.53)*** 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .026 
(2.07)** 
 .013 
(.76) 
          Employment     
Election Year 
.124 
(1.12) 
   
Term Mean 
 .093 
(.72) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .011 
(.34) 
  
          Wages:     
Election Year 
.026 
(3.29)*** 
   
Term Mean 
 .027 
(2.96)*** 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .076 
(.83) 
  
          Purchasing Power Index:     
Election Year 
  .042 
(.72) 
 
% Variation over the Term 
   .057 
(1.79)* 
          # Observations 839 839 650 438 
# Municipalities 275 275 274 265 
# Elections 4 4 3 2 
Adjusted R2 .36 .36 .40 .57 
     
Notes: - Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; 
- Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the 
incumbent; 
- Models estimated with a constant; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis;  
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
 
